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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ST ... ~TE OF l~TAH, by and through its 
ROAD f~OMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and R espcrndentf 
vs .. ? 
THE DE='IV.ER AND RIO GRANDE J~ 
'VES1~ERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a De1a \vare corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 




The parties \vill somctimeH be designated in this brief 
as follo,vg: Defendant and Appellant~ The Denver and Rio 
Grande \Vestern Railroad Company as the ,;'Rio Grande~~' 
Plaintiff and Respondentt State of Utah, by and through 
its Road Commis~·don 1 as the ''Road C·ommission~~~ Emphasis 
has been supplied. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal presents the question of whether the Road 
Commission may lawfully condemn the entire Little Cotton .. 
wood Branch of railroad of Rio Grande. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no issue of the adequacy of compensation or 
any substantial question of fact in this case. A proper pre-
Hentation of the questions of 1aw, however:~ requires an un-
derstanding of the facts+ 
Rio Grande is a common carrier of persons and prop-
erty by rai 1 in intrastate and interstate commerce. Its main 
Iine of railroad from Salt Lake City to Colorado points runs 
in a north and south direction genera 11y along the center 
of the Salt Lake Valley. In the City of Midvale this main 
line crosses at grade an east and west street known as 
Center Street. Near the point of this crossing two branch 
lines of Rio Gran de "'s railroad are taken out from its main 
Jine (Exhibit P-1) ~ 
One of these branches kn O"Wll as the ''Little Cottonwood 
Branch'~ is taken out of the main 11 ne immediately south of 
Center Street and runs in an easter] y direction abutting the 
south side of Center Street on premises owned in fee by 
Rio Grande a distance of some 3,000 feet and then extends 
souther1y crossing State Street and serving industries on 
the east side of State Street.. This branch line extends ap-
proximately 1. 7 5 miles and has approximately .43 miles of 
side tracks~ It had for the year 1957 an assessed valuation 
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of $6,526.00. This branch line presently serves directly an 
oil company and a coal company, and through a team track 
a rock wool company,. a builders supply company~ and other 
consignees ( R. 25. 33t 80-83) . 
During the calendar year 1956 the gross revenues of 
the Little Cottonwood Branch were $21,566.86 (Exhibit 
D-13). During the calendar years 1957 and 1958 and for 
the first two months of 1959 the carload traffic moving 
over the said branch was as follows (Exhibit D-14,. 15 and 
16): 
Period Number of Cars 
1957 ...... - . - . - . 120 
1958 . - . . . . . . . . . - . - . . . 142 
First Two 
Months 1959 48 





Taking out of said main line immediately north of 
Center Street, Rio Grande has another branch line known 
as the '~Bingham and Garfield Branch/:t which runs west-
erly down Center Street of Midvale and serves mines and 
industries in the Bingham and Garfield area ( R. 7 4) . 
Center Street is a road design ate d by statutes as a part 
of the State Road System and is under the jurisdiction of 
the State Road Commission~ The right of way owned in 
fee by Rio Grande for its Little Cottonwood Branch is ap-
proximately 27 feet in width and abuts along and runs 
parallel to the south side oi Center Street for a distan~ e of 
approximately 3,000 feet. Abutting upon the south side of 
such right of \Vay are residential properties owned by r esi-
dents of the City of Midvale (Exhibit P~l). The tracks of 
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Rio Grande on its Little Cottonwood Branch are elevated 
above the street level of Center Street some 6 to 13 inches 
(R~ 43) L The Road Commission, Midvale City and Rio 
Grande have since 1954 been considering a plan for the 
improvement of Center Street from the point where it 
crosses Rio Grande's main line easterly to State Streett 
whereby the tracks of Rio Grande on this branch would be 
lowered, and the entire area paved over and used as part 
of Center Street. After considerable negotiation the form 
of agreement for carrying out .such plan was approved by 
the Road Commission and on January lOl' 1957, transmitted 
to Rio Grande for execution. Rio Grande executed the same 
and transmitted it to the Road Commission on July 19, 1957. 
The Road Commission never signed the agreement (Ex-
hibits D-3 through D-11). Prior to transmitting the form 
of agreement to Rio Grande for the lowering and paving 
over of its tracks on Center Street~" the Road Commission 
in October or 1\""ovember, 1956~ entered into a contract for 
the improvement of Center Street under Project 1580. The 
construction under this contract has now been comp1eted. 
The project for lo"\vering Rio Grande's tracks and paving 
over has never been carried out although it could he com-
pleted in about thirty days time (R. 24, 82) . 
.... ~fter having arrived at a basis of agreement with Rio 
Grande for the hnvering of its tracks and the paving over 
of the track area the Road Commission changed its mind 
about completing the street project and asserted that the 
Lit tie Cotton,vood Bra11ch should be removed and destroyed 
in its entirety. This Rio Grande \\ras unwilling to do~ and 
the Road Commission brought this action to condemn the 
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entire branch. The reason assigned for such change of posi-
tion on the part of the Road Commission is the future con-
struction of the Valley Free\vay Project No~ 1-01-7 (3) (R~ 
38-40). 
Project 1-01-7 (3) involves the construction of a free-
way "r hich \\o' i 11 be a part of the interstate road system under 
the I!ighvvay Act of 1956~ Thi~ freeway \vill enter Salt 
Lake City at a point known generally as the Beck~s Over-
pass near the Davis County line and ,~ .. ill extend southerly 
through Salt Lake County. The tcnta tive proposal for loca-
tion contemplates that this freeway will be easterly of and 
near Rio Grande'H main line at the point \\-~here the freeway 
crosses Center Street (R. 27-28, Exhibit P-1) + Three prob-
lems require solution in connection \Vith the crossing of the 
freeway at this point. (a) The nature of the grade sepa-
ration between Center Street and the freeway must be 
determined. The present proposal is that Center Street 
will underpass the freeway (R~ 28). (b) The connection 
of the Bingham and Garfield Branch into Rio Grande~s main 
line must be relocated. Rio Grande and the Road Commis-
sion hHYC not yet agreed upon such relocation (R. 75-76, 
84-85) ~ (c) A determination must be made respecting the 
connection of the Little C,ottonwood Branch into Rio 
Grande's main line+ The Commission proposes that this 
eonnection should be destroyed and the entire branch con~ 
demned (R. 28). 
On September 24, 1957, hearing was had before the 
Court below on the motion of the Road Commission for an 
order of immediate occupancy. The motion v;las denied 
which order of denial was affirmed by this Court on inter-
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mediate appeal State v. Denver a.fl.d Rio Gmn.d.e Western 
Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P .. 2d 926 .. 
The cause again came on for hearing before the Court 
below on April 6~ 1959. On May 9~ 1959, judgment was 
entered vesting in the Road Commission fee simple title to 
the entire right of way of the Little Cottonwood Branch of 
Rio Grande (R~ 108). From such judgment this appeal is 
taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EMPOW-
ERED TO CONDEMN THE ENTIRE BRANCH 
OF RIO GRANDE'S RAILROAD. 
POINT II 
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EMPOW~ 
ERED TO CONDEMN RIO GRANDE"'S BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE 
USE. 
POINT III 
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDEtS BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD IS NOT NECESSARY FOR 
THE USE OF THE ROAD COMMISSION. 
POINT IV 
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD IS AN UNLAWFUL INTER ... 
FERENCE WITH COMMERCE .. 
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POINT V 
INDISPENSIBLE P A R T I E S DEFENDANT 
WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TilE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EM POW-
ERED TO CONDEMN THE ENTIRE BRANCH 
OF RIO GRANDE~s RAILROAD. 
This case involves :fundamental questions on the sub-
ject of eminent domain~ They have not heretofore been 
passed upon by this Court. 
In order to determine the legal questions involved it 
h~ necessary at the outset to understand the actual effect 
of the decree of condemnation. The Road Commission in 
this case is seeking essentially to obtain a crossing of Rio 
Grande~s Little Cottonwood Branch by the Valley Freeway .. 
This crossing will be made near the point where such branch 
takes out of Rio Grandets main line, and about one hundred 
feet east of such main line. The crossing will require a tract 
about two hundred feet in width. In order to accomplish 
this crossing the decree not only destroys Rio Grande~s 
branch at the point of cross]ng but vests the fee ti tie to 
the entire branch a mile and three fourths long with all 
side tracks in the State Road Commission .. 
It is elementary that the power of eminent domain rests 
in the people. They have vested the exercise of the power 
in the legislature.. Subject to constitutional limitations the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
legislature has conferred the power upon certain private 
corporations~ municipal corporations and governmental 
agenciesr Lewis,. Eminent Domain~ Third Edition, VoL 1~ 
Section 9. 
The rule has been recognized in this jurisdiction that 
where the right of eminent domain is granted for a particu-
lar purpose~ the statute must be given a liberal construction 
in furtherance of such purpose. Mon.etaire Mining Co. v. 
Columbus Rexall Comolidated Mine.~ Co .. t et al., 53 Utah 
413, 17~1 Pac. 172, Freem-an Gulch Mining Co., et aL v. 
Kennecott Coppe-r Corporation, 119 F. 2d 16. It is equally 
clear~ howevert that the right sought to be exercised. must 
be granted in terms or by necessary implication and if not 
f; o granted it can not be exercised.. This is clearly r~ognized 
in the lJfonetaire case, 8Upra.j where Mr .. Justice Frick at 
page 421 of the t: tah report ga i d : 
''If the right is granted, the court has but one 
duty to perform and that is to enforce it and make 
it effective. Upon the other hand~ if the right is not 
granted~ either in terms or by necessary implic.ation:t 
then the courts are po·w·erless to grant the relief a p-
pellant seeks .. t ~ 
To the same effect is Lewist Eminent Domaint Third 
Edition, Vol. I~ Section 388~ where the rule is stated as fol-
lows: 
''All grants of power by the government are to 
be strictly cons trued~ and this is especially true with 
respect to the power of eminent domain~ which is 
mo1·e harsh and peremptory, in its exercise and oper-
ation than any other. ~An act of this sort/ says 
Bland~ J., ~deserves no favor; to construe it liberally 
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Vt.tf o u ld be sin n! ng against the rights of property.~ 
But, as in other cases,. such a construction will, if 
po~~ible, be given to an act as will carry into effect 
the chief and manifest purpose for which it was 
passed, and such as will give effect to all its words. 
It will be .so construed as to support its validity 
rather than otherwise. ~statutes granting these 
powers are not to be construed so literally, or so 
strict1y as to defeat the evident purpose of the legis-
lature. They are to receive a reasonably strict and 
guarded construction, and the powers granted will 
extend no further than expressly stated~ or than is 
necessary to accomplish the genera1 scope and pur-
pose of the grant. If there remains a doubt as to 
the extent of the po\ver, after all reasonable intend-
ment[-"; in its favor, the doubt should he solved ad-
versely to the c1aim of power.''~ 
Consideration must therefore be given to the Utah 
constitutional limitations and the powers conferred upon 
the Road Commission by the Legislature4 
Section 22, Artic1e I of the Constitution of Utah, pro-
vides that 
~i Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." 
Section 27-9-4J Utah Code Annotated~ 1953,. under 
\vhicb the Road Commission purp<Jrted to acquire the fee 
title to the entire Little Cotton""'·ood Branch of Rio Grande 
provides that 
~~For the purposes of this act, the highway 
authorities of the statet counties,. cities, and to\Vlls 
may acquire private or public property and property 
rights for limited -a eces s fa ci li ties and service roa rls, 
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including rights of accesst air, view, and lightt by 
gift, devise, purchase or condemnation in the same 
manner as such authorities are now or hereafter may 
be authorized by law to acquire such property or 
property rights in connection Vlith highways and 
streets within their respective jurisdiction~ All prop-
erty right}; acquired under the provisions of this act 
shall be in f.ee simpler In connection with the acqu1-
sition of property or property rights for any limited~ 
acces~ facility or portion thereof~ or service road in 
connection therewith, the state, county, cityt or town 
highway authority may t in its discretion~ acquire an 
entire 1ot, block, or tract of Jandt if by so doing, the 
interests of the public will be best served~ even 
though said entire lot~ block, or tract is not immed-
iately needed for the right-of-way proper .. 't 
Th.e power of the Road Commission to exercise the right 
of eminent domain is granted by Section 27-2-9, Utah Code 
Annotatedt 1953t which as amended by Chapter 43t Laws 
of Utaht 1955, pr o'Vides that 
~~The county commissioners or the state road 
commission are a nthorized to acquire by purchaset 
condemnation or otherwise, real property~ or inter-
ests therein, to be used in the construction, main-
tenance~ or operation of state roads, and are author-
ized to purchasej or otherwise acquiret from any 
county} city or other pol i tica1 subdivision of the state, 
real property, or interests thereinJ which may be 
exchanged for, or used in the purchase of other rea] 
property, or interests therein~ to be used in con nee .. 
ti on \Vith the construetion ~ ma.inte nan ceJ or opera-
tion of state roads~ and are authorized to lease, sell 
or otherwise dispose of real property acquired by 
it for road purposes when such properly is no longer 
needed for such purposes. Any such sale may be 
made at private or public sale and the proceeds 
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thereof shall be turned over to the state treasurer 
and credited to the state road operating fund. In 
the disposition of land at any such private sale, first 
consideration shall be given to the original grantor 
or his successor in interest .. Nothing in this section 
shall be held to prohibit any county or city from 
contributing to the :State road commission real or 
personal property for state roa.d purposes~H 
The validity of the judgment of condemnation must 
therefore be tested in the light of the foregoing eonstitu .. 
tional limitation and the statutory requirements .. 
The constitutional provision requires that property 
must be taken for a pub1ic use. In the construction of these 
words two lines of decisions have developed. One line of 
decisions holds that public use means use by the public-
that is~ pubHc employment-and conHequently that to make 
a u.se public~ a duty must devolve on the corporation or body 
holding property by right of eminent domain to furnish the 
public. with the use intended~ and that there must be a right 
on the part of the public, or some portion of it, to use the 
property after it is condemned. The other line of decisions 
has announced the so-called ,;~=ru blic Benefit Doctrine'' and 
has arisen in certain states where it was considered a mat-
ter of general community welfare to develop such resources 
as water, minerals or utility of land, and finds its expres-
sion in such cases as Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min-
ing Co., 28 Utah 215~ 78 Pac .. 296~ 200 U. S. 527~ and Clark 
v. Nasht 27 Utah 158~ 75 Pac .. 371, 198 Ur S. 361. See 18 
Am. Jur., Eminent Domain~ Section 36, and Lewis~ Eminent 
Domain, Third Edition, VoJume I~ Section 257. 
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This difference cf point of view is of no importance 
in the case at bar~ however~ for no better example of a public 
use can be found that that of a high~~ay, where the ease~ 
ment or title vests in the public for the common and equal 
use of all. Lewis~ Eminent Domain~ Third Editiont Volume 
I, Section 259. 
If the Valley Freeway were to occupy only the portion 
of Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch at the point of 
crossing and the condemnation were limited to this areaJ 
there could be no doubt that there would be public use of 
the property so occupiedr Is it not equa 11y clear that there 
-will be no public use of Rio Grande's branch of railroad a 
mile and three-fourths away. There is not the s1ightest 
suggestion or contention here that any part of Rio GrandeJs 
property, except that occupied by the proposed freeway 
and that abutting upon Center Street ever will or can be 
used for high,vay purposes~ Manifestly, it seems to us that 
the cond em nation of this en tire branch of railroad is not 
the taking of property for public use and is in direct viola.-
tion of the constitutional limitation~ 
Turning to a consideration of the statutory provisions 
set forth above, the said Section 27-9-4~ provides that the 
Road Commission may acquire an entire lot, block~ or tract 
of landt if by so doing, the interests of the public will be 
best servedt even though said entire lot~ block~ or tract of 
land is not immediately needed for the right~of-way proper. 
These provigions mu~t be read in connection with the fore-
going constitutional limitation, for obviously the legisla-
ture has the power and only the power to permit property 
to be taken for a pub lie us e. The legislature cannot author .. 
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ize the Road Commission or any other body to take private 
property \\rhieh will not be devoted to a public use. This 
proposition is stated by Lewis, Eminent Domainl' Third 
Ectition, Volume 2, Secti-on 600, as follows : 
''If we consider all the statutes now in force or 
'vhich ever have been in force in this country~ pro-
viding for the exercise of the eminent domain power~ 
undoubtedly the great majority have not limited the 
taking to what is necessary for the purpose in ques-
tion. But 'v e think that the constitution impliedly 
forbids the taking for public use of what is not nec-
essary for such use and, the ref ore, though the con-
stitution and statute are silent on the subject of 
necessity l' that the power to take is, in every case, 
Jimited to such and so much property as is necessary 
for the public use in question, and that the owner is 
entitled, either in the proceedings to condemn or 
othenvise~ to be heard upon this question+'~ 
See also 18 Am. Jur.l' Eminent Domain} Section 110. 
Cnder the said Section 27-9-4, the Road Commission 
may therefore take on]y 'vhat is reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the intended pu b1ic use. Lewis~ Eminent Do-
main, Third Edition, Volume 2, Section 453. 
The proper principle on this subj~t i~, we believe, 
stated by the Supreme Court of Io\va in Bennett~ et aL v. 
City of 1.ll a1-£on, 76 N. \V. 844, at page 846 as follows : 
'~If the land ~ought to be taken 'vi ll to some 
extent conduce to the public use for which it is to 
be devoted, the decision of the municipality that it 
is necessary therefor should not be interfered \Vith; 
other,vise it should be set aside." 
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Applying this rule to the facts in the case at bar~ how 
can it reasonably be said that a branch oi railway right-of-
way more than a mile away from the crossing desired can 
possibly be devoted to the public use of the Valley Freeway. 
Upon this principle the judgment of the Court condemning 
in fee this entire branch of railroad must be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE ROAD COMMISSION IS NOT EMPO\V-
ERED TO CONDEMN RIO GRANDE~s BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE 
USE. 
It should be observed in this case that the judgment 
of the court below is not entered under the provisions of 
Section 78-34-2~ Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which author-
izes only the taking of an easement in the case of highways, 
but p urport.s to be entered under said Section 27 -9-4~ which 
authorizes the taking of a fee~ The taking of a fee is author-
ized only in the case of limited access high ways. The on1y 
limited access highway involved here is the Valley Freeway, 
which will occupy a parcel some two hundred feet in width 
at the crossing of the Little Cotton wood Branch~ To ac-
commodate this crossing the Road Commission is seeking 
to take the fee to the entire branch of railroad~ 
:\I ore over, as the evidence sh o'vs (Ex hi bit D -12) if 
Center Street underpasses the Valley Freeway and the main 
line of Rio Grande, the Bingham and Garfield Branch of 
Rio Grande must be relocated~ However~ no solution has 
been rea r.he d regarding such re1 oca tion ~ If rei oca ti on js 
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not feasible then the plan of underpassing the freeway and 
Rio Grande~s main line must be revised. Sueh revision may 
obviate entirely the necessity of the destruction of Rio 
Grande~s Little Cotton woe d Branch. A cc.ordingly ~ the j udg-
ment vesting fee title in the Road Commission to that branch 
may very well be futile and premature. The Road Commis-
sion should not be permitted to accomplish such a harsh 
and destructive taking unless the necessity therefor 1s 
clearly established. To do so is an abuse of its power. 
POINT III 
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD IS NOT NECESSARY FOR 
THE USE OF THE ROAD COMMISSION. 
In this brief we have thus far considered an attempted 
taking by the Road Commission which we conceive to be 
un1awfu1~ It should not be assumed therefrom that appel-
lant is engaged in tactiCB of obstruction~ We well recognize 
the importance of hig h'vays~ particularly the interstate 
system now in the course of construction.. We recognize also 
the responsibilities of the Road Commission in connection 
therewith~ 0 ur con cern here is simply that in the haste to 
facilitate this highway program fundamental rights should 
be recognized and adhered to~ 
In our view the Road Commission is clothed with ample 
power to construct without difficulty all its required facili-
ties in the area involved. The power is found in Subsection 
(5) of Section 78-34-3~" Utah Code Annotatedt 1953~ which 
provides as fol]ows: 
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~~ ( 5) All rights-of ... w ay for any and all pur-
poses mentioned in section 7g....34 .. 1 hereof~ and any 
and all structures and improvements thereon~ and 
the lands held or used in connection therewitht shall 
be subject to be connected with~ crossed or inter-
sected by any other right-of-way or improvem-ent or 
structure thereon ; they shall also be subject to a 
limited use in common vri th the owners thereof~ 
when necessary ; but such uses of crossings, inter~ 
sections and connections shall be made in the manner 
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and 
the least private injury.'~ 
The foregoing provisions \Vere designed expressly for 
a situation su eh as that involved here. Appell ant recognizes 
the right of the Road Commission to cross its branch. A 
separation of grade will be necessary, but that is being done 
at railroad crossings throughout the whole country. It may 
require that the freeway be e 1evated, but that likewise is 
being done in many places, and particular l.Y right in the 
heart of Salt Lake City. It may require a greater expendi-
ture than the destru(..1ion of Rio Grande's Little Cotton wood 
Branch. But 've have never understood the law to be that 
increased cost jus ti iies an unlawful taking~ 
The Road Commission has contended in this cause that 
it may take Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch under 
the provisions of Subsection (3) of said Section 78-34-3. The 
answer to this contention, ho,Never, !ie.g in the proposition 
that the Road Commission is firmly bound under Subsection 
(3) by the constitutional limitations and statutes here con-
sidered. \Vh atever may be sho,vn \Vi th respect to more 
necessary public use does not enlarge the po,ver of the Road 
Commission to take appellant'R property. ~\s "iYC have sho,vn 
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the attempted taking here is unlawfuL It is no less unlawful 
even though a greater public use may be involved~ 
POINT IV 
THE TAKING OF RIO GRANDE'S BRANCH 
OF RAILROAD IS AN UNLAWFUL INTER-
FERENCE WITH COMMERCE. 
Ever ~ince the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Gibb01tS v. Ogden, 9 Wheat4 1, 6 L. Ed. 23, 
the principle has been firmly established that the states are 
without power or authority to impede substantially the 
flow of commerce from state to state. See Southern Pacific 
Company v4 State af Arizonat 325 U. S. 761~ 65 S. Ct. 1515~ 
and collection of cases at pages 1519-20 of S. Ct. Reporter. 
Compare Denvc1· & Rio Grande Railroa-d Company v. City 
and County of Den~~(~l', et al.i' 250 U. S .. 241. 
In the case at bar the judgment of the trial court does 
not regulate or interfere vr.ith interstate traffic on the 
branch in question, it absolutely terminates that traffic. 
The volume of such traffic for 1957~ 1958, and the first 
two months of 1959 i8 shown on defendant~s Exhibits 14, 
15 and 16, and .summarized in the statement of facts above. 
Wbile the volume of such traffic is not large in comparison 
with that moving on appellant's main line} it is nevertheless 
substantial and appears to be increasing. 
The Road Commission by destroying the connection of 
the branch into the rna in line destroys the branch itself and 
terminates all traffic moving over the branch. In principle 
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this case is like that of Kansas City S ou.tkern Railway Com-
pany v. Kaw llaUey Drainage DistrictJ 233 U. S. 75, where 
the action of the state agency destroyed a bridge on the line 
of the railroad, V{ hich was held by the Supreme Court to be 
an t1nla wful interference with commerce. 
POINT V 
INDISPENSIBLE P A R T I E S DEFENDANT 
WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION. 
"\V e recognize the general rule that a party "'"ho is 
joined may not complain of t'he non-joinder of a necessary 
or indispensible party. It is clearly established, however, 
that the proceedings are nugatory as to parties who have 
not been joined. Levris, Eminent Domain, Third Editiont 
Vo1ume 2~ Section 538. 
The case at bar does not present the ordinary situation 
of the condemnation of a tract of land. The branch in que& 
tion is a highway.. Oregon ShoTt Line Railroad Co .. v. Mur-
ray City~ 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P ~ 2d 798~ Connections to this 
highway by industries and individuals U8ing the branch 
are valuable property right~~ The condemnation of the 
branch destrojrs these rights~ Without joinder of these par-
ties the proceedings are nugatory as to them~ Their prop-
erty cannot be taken in this proceeding. These propositions 
only serve to further demonstrate the invalidity of the tak-
ing in questiont and the wisdom of invoking the provisions 
of S u bseetion ( 5) of said Section 7 8-34-3. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of condemnation of the Court below 
ould be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VAN COTT_, BAGLEY, 
C.QRNW ALL & McCARTHY, 
AttnYJU~ys for Defendant 
and Appellant.. 
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